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STUDENT COMMENTS
LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE A.D.C. PROGRAM IN OHIO
I. Introduction
T HE TERM "welfare rights" has no one precise meaning. The
concept embraces political, legal, moral, ethical, social, and
economic issues. The way one defines the term depends on who
one is and from what perspective one regards the issues raised.
It is a matter of identity, outlook, and point of view.
To the substantial middle class, with its traditional hierarchy
of values and standard of ethics, the notion that one has a "right"
to welfare benefits may appear unfathomable, a contradiction in
terms. To the person raised largely by the tenets of the Puritan
Ethic, the idea of anyone demanding welfare seems incredible.
To the welfare recipient or his organized spokesman, "wel-
fare rights" may even include the idea that one is entitled to
demand a certain minimum standard of living. That is, not only
has one a right to welfare benefits, but also to that standard of
living to which he and his peers consider themselves entitled.
The destitute want to share more fully in the affluence of our
society, while the wealthy and middle classes, not surprisingly,
want to retain as much as possible of their present opulence. The
pie is only so big; hence to give to one group is to take away from
another. Much verbal ammunition has been expended in a war
of words over who is justly entitled to what. Predictably, the
"haves" and the "have-nots" each continue to pursue their own
interests at the expense of the other and to the general detriment
of our somewhat schizophrenic society.'
The "haves" typically view the "have-nots" as an unruly,
shiftless, urban mass who seem bent on destroying many of our
existing institutions. The "have-nots" commonly see the "haves"
as a selfish, unfeeling, social Darwinistic class of people who are
unaware of and unsympathetic to the present trends and needs
of our society.
It is the task of the legislature, the appropriate administra-
tive agencies, and the bench and bar to rise above this narrow,
1 See L. Diamond, The Law of the Poor 33 (1966). "We speak glibly of 'sick'
and of 'healthy' economies; because schizophrenia is a disease of the mind
characterized by fragmentation and internal division of the ego, so a nation
divided against itself is schizophrenic."
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stereotyped kind of thinking and to provide workable solutions
to the problems confronting, and created by, our urban poor.
Much new law has been enacted for the purpose of creating and
administering welfare programs. 2 But the whole (combined)
welfare program is itself plagued with internal problems and
disputes over goals.
The code provisions and their supplemental rules and regu-
lations do not answer the question of whether an individual has
a "right" to welfare benefits. There has been little litigation over
the point; consequently, there has been little judicial analysis of
the relative rights and duties of the parties involved. 3 Too much
is left to the inexpert good intentions of the agency administra-
tor.4 However, some reasonably well-defined problems have be-
gun to emerge. Certain justiciable issues are being delineated
with more and more clarity. The purpose of this Comment is to
examine some of these problem areas and to offer some analysis
concerning them. As the title suggests, the discussion will be lim-
ited primarily to Ohio's administration of the Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC) provisions of the Ohio Revised Code.5
H. Sources of the Applicable Law
There are two main sources of welfare law in Ohio: the Ohio
Revised Code and the Public Assistance Manual. Title 51 of the
Code creates and defines the functions of the various welfare
departments. The Ohio Public Assistance Manual (PAM) is a
collection of orders, rules, and regulations promulgated by the
executive head of the Department of Public Welfare and having
the effect of law. Title 3 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for
2 Most authorities regard the Social Security Act of 1935 as the beginning
of welfare law as we know it today. State Codes were then enacted to take
advantage of the Federally assisted categorical programs: Old Age Assist-
ance (OAA), Aid to the Disabled (AD), Aid to the Blind (AB), Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC or ADC), etc. See also, Ohio
Revised Code: § 5105, Division of Aid for the Aged; § 5107, Aid to Dependent
Children; § 5151, Aid for the Needy Blind.
3 D. Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the American Poor Laws, 54
Mich. L. Rev. 607, 631 (1956). "Even on those issues which have been dealt
with at the judicial level there is no unanimity of opinion-perhaps because
of the lack of any accepted postulates to guide the decisions of the judges
(and administrative officials) in this area."
4 Comment, Eligibility Determination in Public Assistance, 115 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1307 (1967). "While some of these failings are due to insufficient
legislative attention, defects in welfare administration are retarding realiza-
tion of the potential presently provided for by statute."
5 Principally, Ohio Rev. Code § 5107.01 to § 5107.16 (1965).
Fall 1969
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the county administration of those welfare functions enumerated
in Title 51.
It appears clear from the Code that it is the duty of the
director of public welfare to provide rules and regulations for
the county welfare directors to follow when administering the
ADC program for the county pursuant to §§ 5107.01 to 5107.16,
inclusive. Put another way, it is the duty of the county welfare
director, under the control and direction of the board of county
commissioners, to administer the ADC program for the county
pursuant to the Code and administrative rules and regulations
prescribed by the director of public welfare.6
As mentioned earlier, those rules and regulations are found
in the Ohio Public Assistance Manual. Section 330 thereof spells
out generally the eligibility requirements for the receipt of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children benefits.7 Section 331 re-
states certain parts of § 5107.03 (A)." Section 331.2 defines "con-
tinued absence of a parent from the home" pursuant to § 5107.03
(E) .9 Section 331.2 has been so recently revised that a thorough
discussion of both the old and new sections is in order. The
6 Section 5101.02 (1968 Supp.) of Ohio Rev. Code, provides in part:
"The director of public welfare is the executive head of the department
of public welfare. All duties conferred on the various divisions and institu-
tions of the department by law or by order of the director shall be per-
formed under such rules and regulations as he prescribes, and shall be un-
der his control."
Section 329.02 (1968 Supp.) provides in part:
"Under the control and direction of the board of county commissioners,
the county director of welfare shall have full charge of the county depart-
ment of welfare."
Section 329.04 (1968 Supp.) provides in part:
"The county department of welfare shall have, exercise, and perform,
under the control and direction of the board of county commissioners, the
following powers and duties:
(A) To be the "county administration" for all the purposes of sections
5107.01 to 5107.16, inclusive, of the Revised Code; . . ."
7 § 330, PAM: "Aid to Dependent Children. . . . A 'dependent child' is a
needy child under 21 years of age who has been deprived of parental sup-
port or care by reason of any of the following: death, continued absence of
the parent from the home, the unemployment of an employable parent, or
physical or mental incapacity of a parent."
8 § 331, PAM: Deprivation of Parental Support or Care. "A child may be
deprived of the support or care of either parent by reason of the death or
incapacity of the parent, the unemployment of an employable parent, or by
reason of the parent's continued absence from the home. .. ."
9 § 331.2, PAM (Effective July 1, 1963; Superseded August 1, 1969): Con-
tinued absence from the home. "Continued absence means that one of the
parents is out of the home for a continuing period of time, and, as a result
the physical care, maintenance, and guidance of the child has been inter-
rupted or terminated ......
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August 1, 1969 revision will be considered later, but it is appro-
priate at this point to undertake a sentence-by-sentence analysis
of the pre-1969 section.
M. Analysis of the Pre-1969 Law
Continued absence of a parent from the home under
§ 5107.03 (A) (E), was defined in § 331.2 of the PAM as a situ-
ation in which one of the parents is out of the home for a signifi-
cant continuing period of time. Section 331.2 stated further (and
still states) that continued absence means an absence for a con-
tinuing period of time with the result that the physical care,
maintenance, and guidance of the children has been interrupted
or terminated. This is wholly consistent with the "needy child"
intendment of the Code. No problems of construction or appli-
cation appear thus far. What followed, however, was the source
of some contention.
Section 331.2 continued: "The following situations provide
a basis for determining if continued absence from the home
exists." Five situations were then enumerated.10 The Manual
indicated that the five enumerated situations were merely a basis
for determining whether the requisite absence existed. A reason-
able interpretation, therefore, would be that they were simply
situations which, if found to exist, would provide at least prima
facie evidence of continued absence, thereby making further for-
mal proof thereof unnecessary. In the actual administration of
the program however, those enumerated situations were appar-
ently accorded the weight of conclusive presumptions. That is,
if a mother as sole caretaker of her needy children were to show
the existence of any of the five, she would be granted ADC
assistance. However, the converse was also true. If none of the
10 § 331.2, PAM (Effective July 1, 1963; superseded August 1, 1969):
... The following situations provide a basis for determining if continued
absence from the home exists.
(1) The parents are divorced or legally separated, or have begun action in
a court to secure a divorce or legal separation, and are not living to-
gether.(2) The parent is in a prison, jail, or workhouse and has been sentenced to
a term of at least six months.
(3) The mother of a child has never been married to the father of the child
and is not living with him.(4) An actual separation of the parents has existed for six months or longer
and there is no plan for them to be reunited.
(5) The parent has been absent from the home for three months or longer,
and non-support or abandonment charges have been filed against the
absent parent in a court of record.
Fall 1969
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five situations could be shown, then there was a conclusive pre-
sumption that no continued absence existed. There being no con-
tinued absence, there could be no eligibility. By the use of this
logic, the welfare department changed a seemingly ordinary
enumeration of examples into a list of absolute and exhaustive
conditions precedent to eligibility without regard to the actual
absence of a parent or the genuine need of the children.
The futility of attempting to determine the intended meaning
of the Manual language is obvious. It is the policy of the welfare
department which affects the public assistance group, not the
actual meaning of the Manual language. The true meaning is
unimportant except to show that the actions of the welfare de-
partment may be inconsistent therewith. Whether such incon-
sistency is the result of a deliberate discrimination against the
public assistance group or merely the result of a simple mis-
construction of the Manual phraseology cannot be here deter-
mined. In any event, it is not the purpose of this Comment to
examine the motives of the welfare department. The purpose is
merely to consider the consequences which follow from such a
restrictive, if not emasculatory, interpretation of Manual (or
Code) language.
For purposes of analysis, assume the existence of a family
of nine-a mother, father, and seven minor children. Assume
further that the father one day leaves the home for parts un-
known, voicing his intention to absent himself from the state and
never to return. He takes with him the bank account, if any, and
the family's earning power. The wife, who is unskilled and
undereducated, is further confined to the home by seven depend-
ent children.
The abandoned mother, before the passage of six months
time (and before the 1969 revision of § 331.2 of the PAM) peti-
tions the county welfare department for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. There she is told that she must:
1. begin immediately an action for divorce or legal sepa-
ration;
2. wait three months and file abandonment or non-support
charges;
3. or otherwise wait six months and then reapply.
Assume now that this woman goes to an attorney's office
and asks him to get her a divorce in order that she might qualify
for ADC Assistance; or, in the alternative, that he challenge what
5
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appears to her to be an arbitrarily oppressive regulation. The
lawyer will probably begin by considering the appropriateness
of a divorce or other legal remedy and the availability of an
administrative appeal. Further examination of these remedies,
however, may lead him to conclude that they are of dubious
efficacy in the case at hand.
(a) The availability of an administrative appeal: A check of the
appropriate Code and Manual sections will reveal that an admin-
istrative appeal is provided, apparently as a matter of right, to
those aggrieved by the decision of the county administrator."
This means, of course, that the county administrator's decision
is not a final order appealable directly to the Court of Common
Pleas unless the appeal is on such grounds as would obviate the
exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement. 2
The administrative hearing, while available, is unfortunately
less than adequate. The hearing examiner normally confines his
inquiry to questions relating only to whether or not the county
administrator has properly followed the Manual, in this case
11 Section 5107.02, RC, provides, in part:
"The department of public welfare shall administer sections 5107.01 to
to 5107.16 inclusive, of the Revised Code. The department may:
(F) Afford a fair hearing to any individual entitled thereto under sec-
tion 5107.05 of the Revised Code, in which case the finding and order of the
department shall be final:"
Section 5107.05 provides, in part:
"An applicant or recipient aggrieved because of a county administra-
tions' decision ... may appeal to the department in the manner prescribed
by the department. .. "
Chapter 120 of the Ohio Public Assistance Manual provides:
"Fair hearing procedures are designed to assure an applicant or re-
cipient of public assistance under any categorical program (AFA, AB, ADC,
AFD) the right to request and to have a fair hearing before a delegated
representative of the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Welfare...."
"An applicant for or recipient of public assistance on any categorical
program (AFA, AB, ADC, AFD) has the right to request a fair hearing if
he is not satisfied by an action of the County Welfare Department.
12 Section 2506.01, RC, provides in part:
"Every final order .... of any officer, ... department or other division
of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the Common
Pleas Court of the county in which the principal office of the political sub-
division is located ....
A 'final order, adjudication, or decision' does not include any order
from which an appeal is granted by rule, ordinance, or statute to a higher
administrative authority and a right to a hearing on such appeal is pro-
vided; . . . (Emphasis added)"
Fall 1969
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§ 331.2 regarding ADC eligibility. As before mentioned, having
decided that the five enumerated situations" are absolute con-
ditions precedent to eligibility,14 the examiner will affirm the
county's position as consistent therewith. Since the county ad-
ministrator's decision will be affirmed unless he has violated the
Manual provisions, and since it is the Manual provisions which
the woman finds objectionable, the hearing is of little avail.
(b) The appropriateness of a divorce: In order to determine
the desirability of a divorce, an attorney must ask himself what
benefits (in addition to ADC eligibility) will accrue to his client.
What disposition of persons and property is the court likely to
make as part of an absolute divorce decree? Separation of the
parties? An order to the defendant to vacate the premises?
Child custody? Child support? In the case posed the parties are
already separated. The woman is already in possession of the
premises. She already has custody of the children, and since the
absent husband usually cannot be found and served, a meaning-
ful support order obviously is not possible. 15 Theoretically, a
divorce would make it possible for the woman to remarry, but
in reality the marital opportunities available to a woman with
numerous children and little money are exceedingly limited. It
is fair to say, therefore, that virtually the only thing the woman
would gain by a divorce would be ADC eligibility.
IV. Constitutionality of the Pre-1969 Law
A. Under the Due Process Clause
It appears clear that state actions affecting governmental
benefits are restricted by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. This is true whether such benefits are con-
sidered rights or privileges. In public assistance cases the denial
of benefits must meet due process standards;' 6 and to satisfy the
requirements of due process, the standards established by the
rules must bear some reasonable relation to actual fact.
13 Supra note 10.
14 Supra at 6 and 7.
15 Even if the husband could be found, his duty to support would probably
not be based on the divorce decree, but instead on his independent duty to
support under the Uniform Reciprocal Support Act.
16 Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Flemning v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611(1960); and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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The fact to be determined in this instance is the need of the
child.17 A child becomes needy by virtue of being deprived of
parental support or care. To deny that such deprivation could
occur in less than six months' time is to ignore the facts of life.
If it is conclusively presumed that no deprivation or resulting
need exists until six months have passed, then the real fact to be
determined is the passage of time, not the actual deprivation or
need of the child. The applicant has no opportunity to rebut this
arbitrary standard without showing that:
1. a divorce has been filed against the absentee parent;
2. said parent is legally restrained for a term of six months;
3. there is no husband or acknowledged father;
4. or that non-support or abandonment charges have been
filed against the parent who has been absent for three
months or longer.
If any of the above four items were shown as exceptions to
PAM § 331.2(4),17a then it was conclusively presumed that the
requisite deprivation and need existed. Otherwise, the contrary
was presumed. In the opinion of this writer, to assert that actual
need cannot exist in the absence of certain arbitrarily defined
situations is to engage in sophistry and to act very rigidly.
It is clear that the arbitrary standards set out in the pre-
1969 Manual had little direct relation to actual fact. Conse-
quently, it would appear that constitutional issues based on due
process grounds could have been raised with some prospects of
success.
B. Under the Equal Protection Clause
Discrimination between members of a given class should be
forced to withstand scrutiny in the light of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. An interested person can
demand that there be some reasonable justification for distin-
guishing between members of a given class. This leads one to
ask whether there is any reasonable justification for distinguish-
ing between one needy child and another and, if so, whether it is
reasonable to base such a distinction on some differing relation-
ship between their parents.
17 According to the Code, the benefits are contingent only on the avail-
ability of revenues and the need of the child if the § 5107.03 provisions are
met: i.e., deprivation of parental support or care by reason of death, con-
tinued absence, or incapacity of a parent, supra, notes 5, 6, 7.
17a Supra, note 10.
Fall 1969
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 3 [1970], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol3/iss1/2
STUDENT COMMENT
Under the Public Assistance Manual needy children qualified
almost immediately if they were children with one deceased
parent,' 8 with an employable parent who was unemployed,
19 with
a parent who was physically or mentally incapacitated," with
parents who were divorced or legally separated, 21 with a parent
in prison for six months, 22 or with no admitted father.
2 3 How-
ever, if they were needy children who were simply abandoned,
they were forced to wait six months before they became eligible.
2 4
In other words, if a needy child was legitimate, and if his father
was not incarcerated, and if his mother had not divorced his
father (etc.), then such needy child had to wait half a year for
eligibility.
The effect was (and still is) that "[d]estitute and impover-
ished citizens whom legislatures seemingly would intend to be
the beneficiaries of welfare statutes are often denied aid because
they are unable to prove completely their qualifications for assist-
ance." 25 Given the fact of destitution or impoverishment, it
would seem that the only possible reason why such citizens could
not prove their qualification would be that the standards applied
have no necessary relation to destitution or impoverishment-no
necessary relation to actual fact.
A suit has recently been filed in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, challenging the
legality of § 331.2 of the Ohio Public Assistance Manual. This
case, Evans v. White, 26 raises issues based not only on due process
and equal protection grounds, but also on Fourth Amendment
right-to-privacy grounds.2 7 Plaintiffs' cause also proceeds on the
argument that defendants' application of § 331.2 PAM is in
18 Ohio Rev. Code § 5107.03, supra note 6;
PAM §§ 330, 331, supra notes 7, 8;
PAM § 331.1 Death: "The death of either parent establishes that a child
is deprived of parental support or care."
19 Ohio Rev. Code § 5107.03, supra note 6;
PAM §§ 330, 331, supra notes 7, 8.
20 Ohio Rev. Code § 5107.03, supra note 6;
PAM §§ 330, 331, supra notes 7, 8.
21 PAM § 331.2 (1), supra note 10.
22 PAM § 331.2 (2), supra note 10.
23 PAM § 331.2 (3), supra note 10.
24 PAM § 331.2 (4), supra note 10.
25 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1807, 1808 (1967).
26 Case No. 64-146, filed May 14, 1969. This case has not yet reached the
merits.
27 Point V of plaintiffs Memorandum brief, p. 16.
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derogation of the Social Security Act of 1935.28 The plaintiff, on
behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, is praying for
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the enforce-
ment of this section.29 Other cases have recently been filed on
the same or similar issues.30 All challenge the divorce-or-waiting
period regulations of state ADC manual provisions.
Such litigation indicates that public administration regula-
tions, while intended as administrative refinements of existing
law, are suspected by the poor of being contrary to the actual
intent of our welfare law.
V. The 1969 Revision
A few months ago all welfare workers who use the PAM
were sent a letter 31 containing a revision of § 331.2 to take effect
on August 1, 1969. The new PAM, § 331.2, reads as follows:
Continued Absence from the Home. Continued absence
means that one of the parents is out of the home for three
months or more, and, as a result the physical care, main-
tenance, and guidance of the child has been interrupted or
terminated.
This requirement is met if the parents are unmarried
and have not lived together as man and wife, or if one of
the parents has been sentenced to a term of three months
or more in jail, workhouse, or penal institution, or if a parent
has been physically absent from the home for three months
or more.
This revision, while more liberal than the original regula-
tion, reflects the same kind of bureaucratic rigidity that afflicted
the latter. The same objections raised against the old section can
be directed against its successor. There is the same premium put
on illegitimacy, and there is a similar minimum-time-period re-
28 Point VI of plaintiff's Memorandum brief, p. 18.
29 Plaintiff's petition (Case No. 64-146), p. 1. "This is an action for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief authorized by Title 42, United States Code, Sec-tions 1983 and 2000d to secure relief against the enforcement of those parts
of Section 331.2 of the Public Assistance Manual of the State of Ohio De-partment of Public Welfare which denies plaintiffs the equal protection of
the law and due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment, in-fringes upon plaintiff's right to privacy protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment and, in addition, is in violation of the Social Security Act of 1935."
30 Howell v. Department of Social Welfare, DC Cal., ND, No. 46853 (1968);
Jenish v. California, DC Cal., ND, No. 48462 (1968); and Damico v. Califor-
nia, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
31 Manual Transmittal Letter No. 105, dated July 24, 1969. Subject: Change
in Manual Section 331.2, continued absence from the home.
Fall 1969
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quirement. If the revision constitutes an attempt to forestall
judicial attacks on the regulations, it will probably fail to accom-
plish this objective. However, given the interpretation and re-
sulting application of the old manual section, it is not difficult
to understand how such a revision would be formulated.
Probably the most significant mitigating change in the new
section is that it no longer contains any forced-divorce provi-
sions. The 1969 revision makes the procurement of a divorce an
irrelevant factor so far as eligibility is concerned 2 In this re-
spect the revision undeniably has merit, but the section as a
whole still arguably fails to effectuate the basic intent of the
welfare law.
VI. Chapter 400 of the Public Assistance Manual
Two actions have recently been instituted challenging an-
other section of the PAM Chapter 400. 33 This chapter of the
Manual contains regulations setting forth schedules for deter-
mining need. Need is supposed to be determined on a standard
and uniform basis, so that families containing a given number
of individuals will receive, generally speaking, approximately
equal allowances. The two cases referred to challenge the man-
ner in which plaintiffs' ADC budgets were computed by the ad-
ministrator. In both instances plaintiffs had their ADC budgets
reduced because their families included recipients of Social Se-
curity benefits.
In Hill v. Kibler and White34 the plaintiff is the mother
of nine children, two of whom are receiving Social Security bene-
fits owing to the death of their father. The remaining seven chil-
dren are receiving ADC benefits due to the continued absence
from the home of their father. (Mrs. Hill remarried after the
decease of her first husband and was subsequently divorced from
32 The Summit County Welfare Department is currently applying a mix-
ture of both the old and new manual sections. While the new three-month
time standard is being used, the waiting period can nevertheless be short-
circuited by the prompt filing of a divorce. This practice is probably made
necessary by the county's economic plight. The county is forced by its
straitened financial situation to reduce the county-supported General Relief
rolls. It therefore has adopted a policy which encourages applicants to
qualify for the federally-supported ADC rolls.
33 Billings v. Minter and White, Case No. 873118, filed March 19, 1969 in the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and Hill v. Kibler and White,
Case No. 276253, filed May 15, 1969 in the Summit County Court of Common
Pleas. Neither case has reached to the merits as yet.
34 Supra note 33.
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her second husband.) The Summit County Welfare Department
concluded that the Social Security moneys received by the two
children should be considered as income for the entire family.
It therefore reduced her ADC allowance accordingly. Mrs. Hill
thereupon instituted an action for a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, alleging that defendant's actions in reducing her
budget violated:
1. the "actual need" intendment of Ohio Rev. Code
§ 5107.04; 35
2. Tit. 42, United States Code, § 408,36 and Tit. 18, United
States Code, § 2;3 7
3. the Ohio Constitution, Art. I, § 2; and
4. the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV.
In the other case, Billings v. Minter and White s3 the plaintiff
charges that the policies of the welfare administrators in Cuya-
hoga County are arbitrary and that these policies bring about
a misappropriation of Social Security funds.
Since there are no decided cases in Ohio discussing the
issues raised by the Hill and Billings cases, it is impossible to
predict their outcome. However, it is gratifying to see that such
issues are now being aired in court. The decisions may disclose
that, contrary to the beliefs of many welfare administrators, the
PAM may not represent a proper statement of what our welfare
law intends.
35 Section 5107.04 provides in part:
"The amount of aid payable under Section 5107.01 to 5107.16, inclusive,
of the Revised Code, in respect to any children living in the same home
shall be determined on the basis of actual need and shall be sufficient toprovide support and care requisite for health and decency, taking into ac-
count the resources and income from other sources of such children, theirparents, and the relatives in whose home they are living." (Emphasis
added.)
36 Title 42, U.S.C. § 408, provides, in part:
"Whoever-
(c) having made application to receive payment under this subchapter(Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance) for the use and benefit of
another and having received such a payment, knowingly and willfully con-
verts such a payment, or any part thereof, to a use other than for the use
and benefit of such other person; shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both."
3T Title 18 U.S.C. § 2:
(a) "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids,
abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punish-
able as a principal." (Emphasis added.)
38 Supra note 33.
Fall 1969
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STUDENT COMMENT
VH. Forecast for the 1970's.
As the Manual becomes more widely applied, due to the
increase in population and the migration from rural areas into
the cities, there will probably be more litigation over its pro-
visions and its application. As the Manual begins increasingly
to be litigated, still more people will inevitably become aware
of their rights under the law; hence questionable welfare prac-
tices will be more likely than formerly to be challenged. This
could become a self-generating process having a cumulative
effect: Litigation breeds increased attention and knowledge;
increased knowledge breeds further litigation. In short, there
is every reason to suppose that this area of the law will hence-
forth be much less quiescent than it has been.
The practicing attorney may wonder what significance all
this has for him, since most litigation in this field involves legal
aid (or Office of Economic Opportunity) lawyers on one side and
the local prosecutor or state attorney general on the other. How-
ever, the legal problems which plague the poor are not restricted
to welfare agency practices. For example, in a forcible entry and
detainer action3 9 which has just been appealed to the Ninth Judi-
cial District Court of Appeals, 40 the appellants are asserting the
equitable defenses of constructive and retaliatory eviction. Thus
simple eviction cases will perhaps not be so simple in the future.
In addition, it seems probable that increased legal attention will
be focused on collection and credit practices in the next few
years. Also, efforts to locate public housing projects in middle
and upper class residential areas appear likely to produce a
flurry of litigation in the early 1970's. In sum, the problems of
the poor appear destined to have a significant impact on many
areas of private law practice in the next decade.
39 Hayden v. Foerg & occupants, Case No. 467332, filed in the Municipal
Court of Akron June 4, 1969 under Ohio Rev. Code § 1923.
40 Notice of Appeal filed July 8, 1969.
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VIII. Conclusion.
Quite apart from conflicting social philosophies, welfare is,
to the extent that the law so decrees, a right. However, an exam-
ination of the operation of our welfare program discloses that
there is some confusion as to how far an applicant's (or recip-
ient's) rights extend and to what degree his rights may be deter-
mined-and restricted-by administrative practices and adminis-
trative judgments.
It is the lawyer's function to define and argue the issues
raised by those who consider themselves aggrieved by the wel-
fare department's actions. The issues raised in a number of cases
now pending (or being appealed) appear to have some merit; and
regardless of the cases' ultimate disposition, the attorneys who
are trying them will have performed a public service by helping
to clarify some of the ambiguities now existing in this area of
the law.
C. DAVID HENSAL
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